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I. INTRODUCTION
It is a privilege to participate in an event that aptly honors Mr. Justice
Linden by inviting us to consider how U.S. tort law might serve as a model
for other legal systems.' His Honor has for some time now been a leading
importer and exponent of a distinctively American approach to tort.2 In
writings marked first and foremost by their concern for the well-being of
ordinary citizens, he has provided a spirited defense of an institution that too
often is the target of undeserved criticism. Viva Linden!'
This is also a propitious time to consider lessons that might be drawn
from the U.S. experience. Nations around the world, including our own, are
reassessing tort law. Domestically, the American Law Institute's massive
Restatement (Third) of Torts project is headed into its third decade.4 Tort
reform rolls on. With European unification have come important efforts to
harmonize European tort law.' Citizens of China are living with new tort
* Professor, Harvard Law School. Thanks to Tony Sebok and Ben Zipursky for helpful
comments, to Dean Martha Minow and Harvard Law School for generous support of my scholarship,
and to the gracious hosts of this excellent conference. Errors in what follows are my responsibility.
1. Strictly speaking, there is relatively little "U.S. tort law" given that primary authority to
define tort law is vested in the States and the District of Columbia. For purposes of this paper, I will
use phrases like "our tort law" and "U.S. tort law" to refer to institutions and rules that are common
to most or all of these jurisdictions.
2. See, e.g., Allen M. Linden, The American Influence on Canadian Tort Law, 50 UCLA L.
REv. 407, 408-14 (2002).
3. Cf Allen M. Linden, Viva Torts!, 5 J. HIGH TECH. L. 139 (2005).
4. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, A CONCISE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS ix-x (Ellen M.
Bublick ed., 2d ed. 2010).
5. See EUROPEAN GROUP ON TORT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW: TEXT AND
COMMENTARY (2005).
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provisions.6
What might be learned from studying our tort law? The answer must of
course turn primarily on the particular circumstances, institutions,
traditions, norms, and ambitions of those doing the studying. But it also
hinges on having a clear-eyed view of the thing being studied. Alas, I
fear that to an outside observer, U.S. tort law is likely to present itself-
somewhat deceptively-as a body of law that vacillates incoherently
between two extremes. Impertinently, I will argue that this appearance
of "bipolarity"7 owes much to the well-intentioned efforts of American
jurists, including our honoree, to advance a thin, two-dimensional
account of tort, according to which it is entirely a matter of forum and
function. A richer and more satisfactory view of tort recognizes that it
has three dimensions-that it is a matter of forum, fill, and function.
One cannot hope to extract lessons from U.S. tort law without
understanding each of these dimensions and how they stand in relation to
one another.
II. THE NOBLE DREAM AND THE NIGHTMARE'
What is distinctive about American tort law? An outside observer
might answer this question by listing features including the following:
(1) ready court access for complainants, driven by a
decentralized, aggressive plaintiffs' bar, contingent fees, and the
American Rule for litigation costs;9 (2) notice pleading, broad
discovery, and minimal judicial oversight of intensely
adversarial litigation;' (3) reliance on lay jurors for fact-finding
and application of legal standards; " (4) generous damage awards
to successful plaintiffs; 12 and (5) a willingness among judges to
6. For an English translation of the recently adopted Chinese tort provisions, see Tort Law of
the People's Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Committee of the Eleventh National
People's Congress, Dec. 26, 2009, effective July 1, 2010), http://www.procedurallaw.cn/english/law/
201001/t20100110_300173.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2010).
7. With apologies to Ernest Weinrib. ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 64-66
(1995) (relying on a different sense of "bipolarity" to articulate tort law's structure).
8. See H.L.A. Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the
Noble Dream, 11 GA. L. REV. 969 (1977) (positing a tendency among American legal scholars to
offer either radically skeptical or radically overstated accounts of the extent to which adjudication is
law-governed).
9. See DAN D. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 38 (2000); Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An
Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 941, 974 (1995) (discussing the
uniqueness of the U.S. contingent fee system).
10. See Arthur R, Miller, From Conley to Twombly and lqbal: A Double Play on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 3-5 (2010) (identifying these features as central to the
influential 1938 federal rules of civil procedure).
11. See id at 5 (noting that modern procedural rules were constructed around the jury trial).
12. See Anthony J. Sebok, Translating the Immeasurable: Thinking About Pain and Suffering
Comparatively, 55 DE PAUL L. REv. 379, 390-92 (2006) (offering evidence that pain and suffering
awards in the United States tend to be magnitudes larger than those in Germany).
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treat individual disputes as occasions to fashion law to achieve
policy objectives such as consumer protection. 13
In narrative form, the story is this. A person who thinks she has
suffered a compensable injury can easily find a lawyer to pursue her
complaint; the economics and the norms of the legal profession encourage a
"throw-it-at-the-wall-and-see-what-sticks" mentality. Early dismissal of suit
is unlikely-trial judges are inclined to give complainants (and jurors) their
due. Discovery will ensue, with both sides seeking information largely free
from judicial supervision. At the same time, the parties will seek to
negotiate a settlement. In many cases, settlement is reached, but in some
there is a trial before a jury. Jurors are instructed to apply the law, but they
rely heavily on their pre-legal, all-things-considered judgments of the
equities of the case as framed by counsel. Sympathetic plaintiffs stand to
obtain verdicts that are frequently accompanied by a monetary award in the
hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars. The award might even be in
the hundreds of millions if plaintiffs counsel (or defense counsel,
inadvertently) induces juror indignation over the defendant's conduct or
litigation tactics. Judges will sign off on even substantial verdicts,
particularly in personal injury cases, so long as they believe that some social
good is being achieved, such as the protection of ordinary citizens against
corporate comer-cutting on safety.
Although the foregoing depiction of U.S. tort law surely has some
support in observable features of tort law, our imagined observer might just
as easily have fastened on a different set of attributes. These would include:
(1) barriers to litigation, including caps on contingent fees,' 4 "loser
pays" rules," mandated preliminary screening mechanisms,16 and
standard-form contracts redirecting claims to defendant-friendly
fora;" (2) heightened pleading requirements;'" (3) judicially and
13. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 15 (5th ed. 1984) (emphasizing
the degree to which considerations of public policy do and should shape judicial decisions in tort
cases).
14. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-120 (2010) (capping contingent fees in medical
malpractice litigation).
15. See generally Walter Olson & David Bernstein, Loser-Pays: Where Next?, 55 MD. L. REV.
1161 (1996) (reviewing use of the "English Rule" in U.S. jurisdictions).
16. CATHERINE T. STRUVE, EXPERTISE IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION: SPECIAL
COURTS, SCREENING PANELS, AND OTHER OPTIONS 55-67 (2003), http://www.pewtrusts.org/
uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Medicalliability/medical malpractice_101603.pdf
17. See generally Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Contracting with Tortfeasors: Mandatory Arbitration
Clauses and Personal Injury Claims, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253 (2004).
18. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2010) (articulating the pleading standard for securities fraud
claims); Ashcraft v. lqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-51 (2009) (affirming the dismissal of plaintiffs
constitutional tort claim under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
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legislatively imposed limits on juror discretion; 9 (4) substantial
legislative and judicial controls on damage awards; 20 and (5) a
sense among judges that they must set liability limitations, even
arbitrary ones, to achieve important policy objectives, particularly
the protection of businesses against crushing or unjust liability. 2 1
A narrative corresponding to this list might stress that: potential claims
often are not filed; filed claims are frequently dropped or settled for small
sums, in part because they are often too expensive to pursue in light of
expected recoveries; procedural and substantive rules grant defendants
multiple opportunities to evade liability; successful plaintiffs often find jury
awards substantially reduced by trial and appellate judges; and common law
and statute grant an array of immunities from liability.
Were she asked to reconcile these two pictures, our imagined observer
might be tempted to conclude that U.S. tort law is an unstable mixture of
diametrically opposing tendencies. An open, flexible, plaintiff-friendly,
jury-driven system of ad hoc regulation and compensation, tort also appears
to be a minefield for claimants, with the mines justified as necessary to ward
off ad hoc regulation and compensation. One could perhaps ascribe
"balance" to this body of law, but only if one uses that term to describe a de
facto stalemate, the way one might use the phrase "balance of power" to
describe a tenuous and temporary peace among nations aiming to conquer
one another. As neither of the two opposing camps has prevailed in the "tort
wars," we are left with a system that, at least for now, arbitrarily splits the
difference.
Returning now to the question of U.S. tort law's value as a model for
other nations, what are we to conclude? The answer seems obvious. Even
to one who grants that certain aspects of U.S. law are well-suited for export,
it seems farcical to imagine that the riven creature I have just described is
one of them. The sounder conclusion would seem to be that academics
familiar with U.S. tort law owe a duty to other nations to warn them against
adopting it.
III. TORT LAW IN Two DIMENSIONS
I will suggest below that tort law in the United States is not so bipolar as
I have been suggesting. Before doing so, however, I would like to consider
19. See, e.g., FED R. EVID. 702 (2010) (inviting judges to screen out purported expert witnesses
whose proposed testimony lacks a sufficient scientific basis); Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549
U.S. 346 (2007) (prohibiting jurors from considering harms caused to non-parties by the defendant
in calculating a punitive damages award).
20. See e.g., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LIABILITY REFORM:
LEGAL ISSUES AND FIFTY-STATE SURVEY OF CAPS ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND NONECONOMIC
DAMAGES (updated April 11, 2005), http://shelby.senate.gov/legislation/MedicalMalpractice.pdf.
21. See, e.g., Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 878 (Cal. 1989) (emphasizing desirability of
establishing clear limits on liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress); Hamilton v.
Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1061-62 (N.Y. 2001) (emphasizing the need for courts to
limit negligence liability for gun-related injuries).
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briefly why it is today plausible to perceive tort law to be at war with itself.
The tale begins at the start of the twentieth century. This too was a time
when many jurists were skeptical of tort, although for reasons other than
those invoked by most modem-day skeptics. Back then, tort was decried as
the poster child for regressive formalism. It was, after all, home to the
privity limitation on liability for injuries caused by carelessly made
products, 22 the "one-leap rule" for carelessly caused fire damage, 23 and the
"unholy trinity" of employer defenses to claims for injuries caused by
carelessly created workplace dangers.24 The Ives decision, which struck
down a New York workers' compensation scheme, was but a particularly
vivid demonstration of the seemingly inescapable linkage between the
common law of tort and an each-man-for-himself conception of rights and
(ir)responsibility. 25
And yet this linkage quickly proved to be anything but inexorable.26 At
a jurisprudential level, Holmes had already shown how tort law could be
decoupled from notions of rights and instead be conceived as a scheme by
which judges, based on policy considerations, set rules specifying when one
person should pay for a loss caused to another.27 Cardozo further
demonstrated that, even from within a traditional conception of judicial craft
and role, courts enjoy considerable authority to revise and innovate.28 The
U.S. Supreme Court's subsequent rejection of the reasoning in Ives29 and the
broad implementation of workers' compensation schemes pointed toward a
world of possibilities for innovative schemes of deterrence and
compensation.
Buoyed by these developments, mid-century revisionist scholars,
including Leon Green and Justice Linden's mentor, William Prosser,
developed a new understanding of the field. Tort was not doomed to be low-
rent, intellectually bankrupt, and politically suspect "private law." It could
22. See, e.g., Winterbottom v. Wright, (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex.) 403; 10 Meeson &
Welsby 109, 109.
23. See, e.g., Ryan v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 35 N.Y. 210 (1866).
24. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 80, at 569 (using the phrase to refer to the fellow-
servant rule, contributory negligence, and assumption of risk).
25. See Ives v. S. Buffalo Ry. Co., 94 N.E. 431, 439-42 (N.Y. 1911).
26. See John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L.
REv. 1733, 1799-1811 (1998) (explaining how the linkage of tort law to laissez-faire depended on a
combination of dubious philosophical claims and contingent political concerns that largely ceased to
obtain by the mid-twentieth century).
27. See OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 79 (Little, Brown & Co. 1945) (1881)
(asserting that the point of tort law is to set rules of conduct which, if broken, require an actor to
indemnify another for losses caused to that other).
28. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 26 at 1767-69 (discussing modern scholars' treatment
of Cardozo's MacPherson opinion as exemplifying a progressive or realistic approach to common
law adjudication).
29. N.Y. Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
325
be part of the exciting new world of "public law"-a branch of the emergent
administrative state in which regulations directed toward certain kinds of
influential actors-especially professionals, businesses, and government
entities-would be crafted primarily by jurors and judges on a case-by-case
basis.30 One merely had to recognize that tort law, like criminal law and
regulatory law, operates as a mechanism of governance. By granting to
persons who suffer injuries the power to haul others into court, it of course
offers individuals a chance to obtain relief. But it also directly (through
damage awards) and indirectly (through publicity) pressures entities and
institutions that exercise substantial influence over ordinary citizens' lives to
act with greater attention to the public welfare.3 ' In Justice Linden's famous
metaphor, tort law could operate as an "ombudsman." 32 As such, it could be
"a weapon of social progress" 33 by providing assistance to and an outlet for
ordinary people who have suffered setbacks.34
To view tort in this manner is to regard it as having two dimensions. I
will label these "forum" and "function." On this conception, tort first
provides a forum in which an individual can complain and demand that her
complaint be attended to. To gain access to this forum one needs only to
"feel[] injured."35 If a person believes that something bad has happened to
her, she has the right to have that grievance adjudicated. The complainant
will not always obtain relief. At a minimum, though, she is given a hearing
and a ruling.
The filing of the complaint in turn creates a space and an occasion for
governance. It is now the job of judges and jurors, subject to legislative
oversight, to decide what to make of these occasions. And they do so based
primarily on a sense of what functionally might be accomplished by the
imposition or rejection of liability. In addition to providing a measure of
relief to the injured, the most obvious function tort might play is to send a
message to powerful actors that they must give due consideration to the
well-being of others. Tort cases can also foster public dialogue and debate
about social problems, particularly problems related to the use and abuse of
power. 36 To be sure, judges' and jurors' regulatory activities cannot be
completely ad hoc-they are guided by substantive and procedural rules.
However, these rules must be treated pragmatically, rather than woodenly or
formalistically: as rules of thumb that, in the typical case, point toward good
outcomes but may be relaxed or abandoned when they do not. If the tort
30. See Allen M. Linden, Tort Law as Ombudsman, 51 CAN. BAR REV. 155, 155-68 (1973)
[hereinafter Ombudsman].
31. See id.
32. See id; Allen M. Linden, Reconsidering Tort Law as Ombudsman, in ISSUES IN TORT LAW
1, 1-23 (Freda M. Steel & Sanda Rodgers-Magnet eds., 1983) [hereinafter Reconsidering].
33. Ombudsman, supra note 30, at 164.
34. See Reconsidering, supra note 32, at 14.
35. Ombudsman, supra note 30, at 158.
36. Reconsidering, supra note 32, at 5; id. at 21 (suggesting that tort law "enables individuals to
protest peacefully and rationally against the abuse of power").
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system is working well then some relief-though perhaps not as much as the
plaintiff might hope to obtain-ordinarily ought to be forthcoming, at least
for any grievance based on a genuine injury that is (a) not wholly self-
inflicted and (b) suffered by a person who is not well-positioned to cope
with it.37
In sum, in the two-dimensional view, plaintiffs are "private attorneys
general." Through the process of claiming for themselves, they invite an
independent government official-the judge-jury composite-to
acknowledge their claims, to respond to their losses, and to do something for
the public's benefit, thereby correcting for gaps or deficiencies in
governance by the political branches. 38
There is much to be said for the progressive reconceptualization of tort.
Its driving impulses are humanitarian and egalitarian. In the period from
1940 to 1980, it helped to fuel a number of salutary doctrinal
developments. 39 Outmoded and ill-considered limitations on liability were
either removed or relaxed. Important new forms of liability emerged,
including strict products liability, as well as the privacy and emotional
distress torts. Alternatives to tort, such as no-fault, received careful attention
as potentially superior regulatory mechanisms.40
Yet for all its virtues, the progressive vision soon generated a
backlash-one that exploded onto the scene as part of a broader reaction to
the Great Society era. 41 As expressed in the modern tort reform movement,
the backlash turned out to be the "conservative" mirror-image of the
progressive vision.4 2  The tort reformer accepts the progressive's two-
dimensional view of what tort law is. However, he then rejects the
progressive's assessment of it, emphasizing at every turn tort's deficiencies
as a species of regulatory law.43
In contrast to the progressive, the conservative is deeply skeptical that
37. See Ombudsman, supra note 30, at 164 (offering examples of cases in which an injury victim
cannot recover for lack of defendant fault and describing these as "problems" that a suitably up-to-
date and flexible tort system would "solve" by affording compensation to the victim).
38. See Reconsidering, supra note 32, at 18 (advocating reforms that would permit a tort trial to
function more fully as "a type of ad hoc royal commission").
39. See generally Gary T. Schwartz, The Vitality of Negligence and the Ethics of Strict Liability,
15 GA. L. REV. 963 (1981) (charting these developments).
40. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 3-16 (1970) (reviewing and critiquing several such plans).
41. Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort
Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 619 (1992).
42. See Deborah L. Rhode, Frivolous Litigation and Civil Justice Reform: Miscasting the
Problem, Recasting the Solution, 54 DUKE L.J. 447, 473 (2004).
43. The following characterization of "the conservative" view of tort is a composite.
Representative statements of the view include: PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL
REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1990) and WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION:
WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (1991).
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tort provides a forum for genuine grievances, or at least grievances beyond
those that ought to be borne by the complainant as part of the ordinary
hardships of life. The font of tort suits, he insists, is not losses. It is a desire
to get a "piece of the pie"-i.e., funds sitting in the bank accounts of
businesses and insurance companies. Indeed, he would say that the U.S. tort
system has created an entire class of well-trained professionals whose
livelihood depends on finding ways to invoke the law as a means of getting
at these funds. Simply put, it is in the interest of plaintiffs' lawyers and
would-be plaintiffs that the latter view themselves as victims. Not
surprisingly, many do, even when they really should not. Hence the
conservative's need for multiple roadblocks to liability.
Contemporary reformers also see in the progressive rendition of the
forum-and-function account of tort a serious problem of political legitimacy.
According to progressives, the plaintiffs complaint initiates the sort of
proceeding that individuals would otherwise lack the ability to initiate. To
the progressive this is one of tort law's chief virtues: the condition of relative
political powerlessness is precisely what tort law helps the ordinary citizen
to overcome. The conservative is deeply skeptical. Of the plaintiff-private
attorney general he asks: "Who deputized you to commence these
proceedings? What if we don't want you to sue?" In a similar vein he asks:
"How is it that, in a democratic political system with elected and expert
policymakers, judges and jurors possess the authority to run a shadow
regulatory system that lacks clear rules of operation and is often at odds with
the system that first-line regulators have sought to put in place?" Not
surprisingly, to combat the alleged evils of illicit regulation, reformers have
sought and obtained measures whose main aim is to reduce the occasions for
tort regulation. This is what the capping of contingent fees and damages,
and the wiping out of particular causes of action, are said to accomplish.
The progressive understanding of tort in terms of forum and function
has been sufficiently influential that, in this country-and perhaps in
others-it tends to be mistaken for tort law itself. When reformers criticize
tort law, they are in fact criticizing this understanding of tort. The notion
that tort law today is a mere hodgepodge of pro-liability and anti-liability
measures is no less premised on that understanding.
IV. TORT LAW IN THREE DIMENSIONS
The progressive and the reformer have left their marks on modern tort
law. Fortunately, however, their shared understanding of tort has never been
fully embraced by academics, much less judges. In fact, the two-
dimensional account is inaccurate and unsustainable. It is too thin or "flat"
to be capable of making sense of tort.
What is missing from the picture, and what renders it ill-fitting and
unstable, is the suppression of the third and most basic dimension of tort.
For alliteration's sake, I will dub this tort law's "fill." One could just as
easily refer to it as tort law's "character" or "substance." Tort is not merely
forum and function. It is forum, fill, and function. To use a tired metaphor,
328
[Vol. 38: 321, 2011] Tort in Three Dimensions
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
two-dimensional accounts attempt to stage Hamlet without the Prince.'
One can't understand the place of forum and function in tort law without
understanding its fill. Tort law's three dimensions are deeply intertwined.
To say that tort law has a certain "fill" is to say that torts are distinctive
legal creatures. This is in part what Professor Weinrib aims to get at in
claiming the mantle of "formalism."4 5 To point out a table, and distinguish
it from a chair or sofa, he says, is to refer to a particular type of thing-
something with a particular "form."46 So, too, when one points to tort, one
is looking at a distinct body of law that stands in contrast to other bodies of
law, such as criminal and regulatory law. To commit a tort is to violate a
norm that specifies how one must act in relation to others. More
specifically, it is to violate a relational norm of non-injury recognized as
binding in judicial decisions and/or statutes (even if only implicitly). Every
tort involves conduct that is wrongful toward and injurious of another. Each
is a trespass in the particular sense of being a mistreatment of another.
To recognize that torts are injurious "wrongings" of others is to
recognize that it is misleading to describe tort law as a governmental
response to tragedies that befall citizens, or to problems that they face. The
facts of tort cases are often tragic. Victims often experience torts as
calamities. Torts frequently pose grave economic and psychological
problems for victims, family members, friends, and colleagues. Tort suits
ideally will help victims cope with the losses they have suffered by virtue of
being victimized. Yet torts are not natural disasters. Nor are they tragedies
or problems to which the state attends in its capacity as regulator or provider
of welfare services. They are wrongs inflicted by one on another. The
state's job, in this domain of law, is to identify with reasonable precision and
plausibility what sort of interactions count as wrongful injurings, and to
provide an avenue for victims to respond to those who have wronged them.
A tort is never a (unilateral) mishap; it is always a (bilateral) mistreatment.
A victim of misfortune that is not traceable to mistreatment-a medical
patient who has a bad outcome even though her treatment was proper; a
person injured by a well-designed product; an innocent citizen who, with
probable cause, is detained for a reasonable period by police-may certainly
be entitled to our sympathies. She might justifiably demand of government
that it take steps to prevent or reduce the incidence or severity of these sorts
of incidents and that it provide her with after-the-fact assistance, should she
need it, in coping with this sort of misfortune. But she is not the victim of a
44. A lawyer appearing before Judge Jack Weinstein once invoked this metaphor to argue that a
proceeding could not take place because of the absence of a key party. Without hesitation, Judge
Weinstein ruled that the litigation could proceed under the authority of Rosencrantz and
Guildenstern are Dead. TOM STOPPARD, ROSENCRANTZ AND GUILDENSTERN ARE DEAD (1966).
45. WEINRIB, supra note 7, at 25-29.
46. Id. at 28.
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tort, and her demands, however justified, are not the province of tort law.
The concept of tortiousness is also not coextensive with, or exhausted
by, the idea of abuse of power. It is a mistake to think of tort law simply as
a device for empowering ordinary citizens to assert a measure of control
over entities and institutions to which citizens would otherwise be
vulnerable. The commission of a particular tort might involve an abuse of
power, and when it does, it often generates a claim for a special form of
victim redress: namely, punitive damages.47 Moreover, some torts, such as
intentional infliction of emotional distress, often involve abuses of power.
However, a plain-vanilla negligence suit by one car driver against another
does not typically provide an occasion for the courts to level an uneven
playing field between victim and injurer, nor to call attention to anti-social
conduct by a powerful entity. The same is true of many standard instances
of assault and battery, defamation, invasion of privacy, nuisance, and
trespass.
To deny that torts are tragedies is not to deny that torts are occasions for
both lamentation and government action. Likewise, to deny that tort law is
safety regulation or a compensation system is not to dispute that a liberal-
democratic government should provide such institutions to its citizens.
Finally, to deny both of these things is not to insist that tort law has nothing
to do with forum or function. Tort law does indeed provide a forum for
citizens, but it is not a general-purpose public forum for the airing of
grievances. It is not a locus for lodging complaints about governmental
overreaching per se, or corporate inattention to consumer welfare, or the
indifference of professionals to the well-being of their clients or patients. It
is a limited-purpose forum-a forum for alleging, pursuing, and perhaps
prevailing on a claim that one has suffered a wrong at the hands of another.49
Correlatively, its function is to specify what counts as mistreatment (the
defining of those injurious acts that count as torts) and to provide an avenue
of recourse for those who have been mistreated.
Understood in terms of forum, fill, and function, tort reemerges as
something distinct from the un-canalized delegation of regulatory authority
to judges and juries that is championed by progressives and demonized by
reformers. It is not an ombudsman. It poses to judges and jurors the
circumscribed job of determining whether a tort-a breach of a relational
norm of non-injury-has occurred, and if so, what remedy is due to the
victim of the wrong. This is hardly an ignoble task, nor, as I will explain
below, is it one that necessarily entails a circumscribed domain of liability,
47. See Huckle v. Money, (1763) 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B.) 768-69; 2 Wilson, K.B. 205, 205-06.
48. Facts that support findings of "outrageous" mistreatment of the sort that will support liability
for intentional infliction of emotional distress may often involve abuses of power relationships,
though such abuse is not necessary or sufficient to establish outrageousness. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. e, at 74 (1965).
49. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REv.
1, 17 (1998).
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but it is a discrete task.o
With the recognition of tort law's third dimension and the rejection of a
flat, two-dimensional conception, it is possible to recognize that current
conflicts about the scope and domain of tort law need not be, and often are
not, simply fights about whether or not to regulate a given activity through
tort. The tort wars are more complicated than this, which is why the
presence of pro- and anti-liability features of U.S. law often do not signal
incoherence. Before condemning tort as a grab-bag of pro-liability and anti-
liability features, we need to know much more about the content and
justifications for the particular features under consideration.
The justification for the distinctive, and in some respects, pro-liability
aspects of the U.S. tort system, such as the contingent fee, is not that it
permits a person of modest means to call powerful actors to task, or receive
needed aid. It is to ensure, as much as possible, that one can press a claim of
wrongdoing even if one does not have the money on hand to do so.
Likewise, reliance on jurors to decide basic issues relevant to liability turns
on the idea that claimants and defendants are usually entitled to ask ordinary
citizens to provide judgments concerning, for example, the content of basic
norms of conduct and the extent to which a wrongdoer ought to be held
responsible for injuring another.
Much the same goes for anti-liability features of tort. Screening panels
and harder-look scrutiny of complaints are not simply checks on the
aggregate amount of malpractice liability; they are checks that aim to ensure
that claims of wrongdoing presented to judges and jurors are credible-they
aim to help tort law do its job of defining wrongs and providing redress for
them.5' Likewise, exemptions from liability must be understood and
assessed not merely as exemptions, but on their merits. Whether sound or
unsound, Congress's decision to immunize gun manufacturers from
''negligent marketing" and other similar claims is vastly more defensible
than would be a statute immunizing gun manufacturers from claims for
injuries caused to users of guns by shoddy manufacturing.5 2 The former
addresses a very attenuated form of wrongdoing or mistreatment-the wrong
of carelessly "enabling" another to intentionally harm someone-that has
gained little or no traction in the courts.53 It is legislation that, in substance,
is respectful of and responsive to tort law's fill.
U.S. tort law today is being buffeted by contending political forces.
Many aspects of tort law, both pro-liability and anti-liability, are surely ripe
50. See infra pp. 332-35.
51. Whether they actually do a good job of this is a different question.
52. Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901-03 (2005).
53. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Intervening Wrongdoing in Tort: The
Restatement (Third)'s Unfortunate Embrace ofNegligent Enabling, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1211,
1218-44 (2009).
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for revision or elimination. But the collection of statutes and judicial
decisions that one finds, even after the thirty-year war over torts, is not
simply random liability and no-liability pockets that are to be totted up into
some sort of aggregate liability-level index. They are, by and large,
attempts-some wise, some foolish; some well-motivated, some poorly
motivated-to fashion a workable law of wrongs and redress that is
responsive to modem circumstances.
V. TORT LAW AND LIBERALITY
Progressives who champion a two-dimensional view of tort seem to
suppose that a three-dimensional understanding entails a miserly,
uncompassionate conception of tort or a downplaying of tort's importance to
the U.S. political and legal systems.54 This is simply a mistake. The scope
of tort on a three-dimensional understanding will depend on which forms of
human interaction courts and legislatures can plausibly deem, and do deem,
to be mistreatments to be recognized as torts. There is no doubt that
American courts and legislatures have at times adopted indefensibly
cramped accounts of what is regarded as a wrongful injuring. They have
also adopted indefensibly broad accounts of when a victim should be
deemed to have forfeited her right to complain about having been
wrongfully injured. However, there is nothing inherent in the idea of
relational, injurious wrongs that entail these outcomes, and many of these
errors have been corrected or ameliorated, though not always as swiftly as
they should have been. Since about 1970, most U.S. jurisdictions have
(cogently, if controversially) treated as a wrong the injuring of a consumer
by a manufacturer through the sale of a product rendered dangerous by a
manufacturing defect, irrespective of the degree of care exercised by the
manufacturer.55  This is a capaciously defined wrong. Although most
progressives would presumably be hostile to the idea, one could likewise
imagine a return to older conceptions of libel and slander, under which
wrongful injuries to reputation could give rise to a vast domain of liability.
There is also no reason to associate a three-dimensional conception of
tort with formalist adjudication or an especially narrow conception of the
judicial role. Though Cardozo's tort opinions are often appropriated by
progressives in aid of their vision, they actually attest to the idea that a judge
working within a three-dimensional view can be flexible and pragmatic.
The author of The Nature of the Judicial Process was no formalist, but
neither was he an exemplar of the progressive vision of judge as ad hoc
regulator, a point that Leon Green and William Prosser seemed to
understand, even if others have not. 6 Cardozo accepted that the job of the
54. A fellow conferee used the term "antiseptic."
55. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
56. For example, both Green and Prosser criticized important Cardozo tort opinions for being too
conceptual. See Leon Green, The Palsgraf Case, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 789, 791 (1930); William L.
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judge in a tort case is to determine whether the plaintiff has alleged a wrong
that is cognizable on the basis of existing law or a reasonable extension or
revision of it.57 To be this sort of judge is not to be an ascetic or moralist (in
a pejorative sense), nor is it to deny that the roster of wrongs to be treated as
torts will and should change over time with changes in economic, political,
and social conditions.18
There is nothing inherently miserly about the three-dimensional view,
just as there is nothing inherently progressive about the two-dimensional
account. In fact, it is likely the case that some actors who have wrongfully
injured others can today avoid liability to which they would otherwise be
subject because of the influence of a two-dimensional conception of tort.
Here I have in mind the law of governmental liability, a branch of tort law
that not coincidentally emerged during the period in which two-dimensional
accounts have been ascendant.
My sense is that American tort law probably departs significantly from
that of England and Commonwealth countries in the degree to which it
protects governmental officials from liability for wrongfully subjecting
citizens to physical force or confinement, and for failing to protect them
from attacks by another private actor.59 The full-blown version of sovereign
immunity is, of course, a thing of the past. But there remain formidable
barriers to recovery in the form of qualified immunities enjoyed by
individual officials against claims for constitutional torts, 60 immunities
enjoyed by govemmental entities under the Federal Tort Claims Act's
"discretionary function" exemption and its state-law equivalents,6 1 and
exemptions provided by common law no-duty rules. 62  Other Anglo-
American systems seem on the whole more prepared to hold government
entities accountable to victims of official wrongdoing, though of course they
Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 7 (1953). Judge Posner, on the other hand, wrongly
supposes that Cardozo made ad hoc policy judgments but then dressed them up in legal language.
See RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 53-55, 126, 134 (1990); John C.P.
Goldberg, The Life of the Law, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1419, 1438-41, 1450-55 (1999) (criticizing
Posner's account).
57. See Goldberg, supra note 56, at 1446; BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921), reprinted in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO 107,
164 (Margaret E. Hall ed., 1967).
58. See Goldberg, supra note 56, at 1440, 1474.
59. See Andrew Hyer, The Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act: A
Proposal for a Workable Analysis, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1091, 1093.
60. See SHELDON H. NAHMOD, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS 445-63 (2d ed. 2001)
(collecting and discussing Supreme Court decisions on qualified immunity).
61. See Hyer, supra note 59, at 1104-16 (summarizing current discretionary function doctrine
and criticisms of it).
62. See, e.g., Kircher v. City of Jamestown, 543 N.E.2d 443 (N.Y. 1989); Riss v. City of N.Y.,
240 N.E.2d 860 (N.Y. 1968).
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too recognize significant limits.63
If this broad-brush contrast is accurate, it perhaps provides an example
of an instance in which the forum-and-function model of tort-championed
by its adherents as a way of expanding legal protections for ordinary
citizens-has actually skewed doctrine in a way that is unfavorable to
claimants who have been wronged. One can assert that tort suits against
government officials are a means of forcing, for example, a police or human
services department to adopt better internal procedures. But doing so only
invites a standard rejoinder that seems to strike a chord with many U.S.
courts: "Even if it is our business to regulate the conduct of private actors
through tort suits, it is emphatically not our business to instruct officials in a
coordinate branch of government how to go about their jobs."
The foregoing example notwithstanding, I can only expect that
progressives-even progressives who are generations removed from the era
in which it made sense to worry that tort law on a three-dimensional view is
fated to be a handmaiden of capital-will continue to insist that the three-
dimensional view is miserly. In an effort to beat back this misimpression, I
will endeavor to conclude on a Lindenian note from within a three-
dimensional conception of tort.
I suggested above that forum-and-function accounts of tort offer an
impoverished conception of the plaintiff's right of action as an ignition key
that starts the motor of government. In offering this suggestion, I did not
and do not mean to assert that private rights of action lack public or political
significance, as if tort suits were purely private affairs. Quite the opposite, I
have been foolish enough to suggest that tort law and tort suits are a part of
this nation's basic political architecture. 4 A person's right to have one's
grievances against another heard in court, and to have a remedy for a wrong
done to him, is no less a part of the constitution of our liberal-democratic
polity than the rights to speak freely, to petition, and to assemble.
Tort suits are politically empowering; they enable people to make
complaints that must be attended to. In principle-though not necessarily in
practice-they are open to all on equal terms. Tort law thus allows ordinary
citizens to activate public institutions, the operation of which they ordinarily
have little say. But it does so only in a particular way. It permits them to
harness state power to obtain an answer from those alleged to have
aggrieved them in certain ways, even where they would otherwise lack the
wherewithal, power, or clout to do so. And it does so without requiring
complainants to win the favor of legislators and bureaucrats or to pursue a
cause that is popular or that happens to sit well with current regulatory
policy. In all these ways, tort law-like the law of property, contract, and
63. See, e.g., ROBERT STEVENS, TORTS AND RIGHTS 218-43 (2009) (analyzing English law).
64. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text; John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional
Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J.
524, 524 (2005).
65. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *136-41.
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restitution-reaffirms to individuals that their interests matter, not just the
interests and concerns of the state or the public. Whatever their other virtues
and efficacies, top-down systems of government benefits cannot serve these
constitutional values.
VI. CONCLUSION
Wise soul that he is, Justice Linden has always been alert to the
constitutional significance of tort law's provision of a forum for ordinary
citizens and their grievances. In this, his work shares a close kinship with
the work of eminent contemporary scholars, including Anita Bernstein and
Michael Rustad.66 All rightly insist that the sometimes grubby, unpleasant,
materialistic, and discomfiting phenomenon of tort litigation is a
fundamentally democratic practice with an integral place in our polity, not
merely a branch of the modern administrative state that is ready to be
supplanted by the market or the creation of additional safety agencies or
benefits schemes. Tort law is not "public law" in the sense that Leon
Green or William Prosser meant. But insofar as the identification of tort law
as "public" is meant to capture the political role that it plays in our system of
government, the identification is apt. Our longstanding commitment to the
idea that the courts must provide fora to resolve claims of wrongful injury is
a commitment that we should celebrate and that other nations should
consider emulating, if they do not already. And in fact, there is some reason
to suppose that, notwithstanding the more collective and bureaucratic bent
that is sometimes said to typify European governance structures, the idea of
empowering individuals to assert claims on their own behalf is gaining some
traction there. Perhaps the same will prove true in China under its new tort
code.
If tort law merely gives occasion to ad hoc efforts at compensation and
regulation fenced in by arbitrary limits, we cannot in good conscience hold it
up as a model for others. If it is to point a way forward, it must be
understood as a law of wrongs and recourse-that is, in terms of forum, fill,
and function.
66. See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, Muss Es Sein? Not Necessarily, Says Tort Law, 67 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 7-8 (2004); Michael L. Rustad, Neglecting the Neglected: The Impact of
Noneconomic Damage Caps on Meritorious Nursing Home Lawsuits, 14 ELDER L.J. 331, 390-91
(2006) (arguing that damage caps for suits brought by victims of nursing home negligence are
unwarranted and have effectively deprived victims of nursing home negligence of the right to pursue
redress for wrongs done to them).
67. See Bernstein, supra note 66, at 7-8; Reconsidering, supra note 32, at 22.
68. Anthony J. Sebok & Lars TrAgirdh, Adversarial Legalism and the Emergence of a New
European Legality: A Comparative Perspective, in IMAGINING NEW LEGALITIES: PRIVACY AND ITS
POSSIBILITIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Austin Sarat, Lawrence Douglas, & Martha Merrill Umphrey,
eds., forthcoming 2011).
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